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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

YV. P. HARLIN CONSTRUCTION )
COl\IP ANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

Case No.
10773

U'l'AH STATE ROAD COl\11\lISSION,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

ST;1TEl\'lENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
The appellant brought suit against the respondent,
setting forth three separate causes of action, wherein
it was alleged that the respondent had breached certain
contracts between the parties, which contracts involved
the construction of certain portions of Interstate 15
projects. The present appeal challenges only the validity
of the pretrial court's dismissal of appellant's first cause
of action.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
In a pretrial order (R. 70, 71, and 72), the pretrial court, the Honorable A.H. Ellett, dismissed appellant's first cause of action. A motion for reconsideration
of the pretrial order ( R. 73-81 ) was also denied by the
pretrial court (R. 86). A petition for interlocutory
appeal was subsequently denied by this court.
Prior to trial, appellant's motion to amend the pretrial order and to permit a trial of the first cause of
action (R. 91, 92) was argued by the parties before the
trial court, and this motion was also denied. Trial then
proceeded on the second and third causes of action set
forth in the appellant's complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the dismissal of appel·
lant's first cause of action should be affirmed.
STATElVIENT OF FACTS
Because of the numerous references to the record
that are intertwined into respondent's arguments, the
following statement of facts will merely attempt to set
forth those facts basic to the dispute.
The parties entered into a contract for the con·
struction of certain Interstate 15 overpass structures
at Second South and Eighth \Vest, Salt Lake City,
Salt Lake County, Utah (R. 1). As a prerequisite to
2

the construction of these structures, pilings to support
the foundations of the structures were to be driven. The
State of Utah Standard Specifications for Road and
Bridge Construction, which were incorporated into and
which constituted a part of the construction contract
(R. 9), set forth in detail the manner and equipment
to be used by the contractor when driving pile ( R. 7, 9) .
A minimum energy rating of 18,000 pounds per blow
was also established ( R. 9).
Appellant attempted to use a combustion type
hammer, known as a Del lVIag D-12 on the project, and
respondent refused to permit appellant the use of this
hammer. This refusal constituted appellant's first cause
of action which was dismissed at the pretrial stage of
the proceedings.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DIS~IISSAL OF APPELLANT'S
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AT THE PRETRIAL STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
WAS 'i\TITIIIN THE AUTHORITY OF THE
PRETRIAL COURT.
Because of the primary philosophy of Utah R. Civ.
P.10, i.e., the simplification and reduction to triable
i~sucs, only those issues which present a real controversy,
it must be acknowledged that the pretrial court is vested
11ith authority and also an obligation to dismiss a cause
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of action where it is clear and apparent that the cause
of action presents no real controversy. As stated in IA
Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 471, at 830 (Rules ed. 1960):
[Two of the four general purposes of the pretrial rule areJ 1. to identify, designate and clarify
the true issues and eliminate the apparent issues
which present no real controversy, land,] 2. to
off er a convenient opportunity for disposing of
preliminary matters, such as dismissal ... judg·
ment ....
It is further stated in IA Barron and Holtzoff,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 483, at 846 (Rules
ed. 1960):

A judgment of dismissal may be rendered
where the admitted facts disclose fatal defects of
jurisdiction or that there is no claim for relief
upon which judgment can be granted.
The general rule also enunciated in 3 Moore, Fed·
eral Practice§ 16.11, at 1115 (2d ed. 1966):
The pretrial conferences enable the parties,
under the mediation of the court, to crystallize
these issues and eliminate those which are not con·
troverted or which use of the deposition and dis·
covery procedure has shown to be without merit.
[Emphasis added.]
In Wirtz v. Young's Electric Sign Co., 315 F.2d
326 (10th Cir. 1963), the court stated, 315 F.2d at 327:
Summary disposition of a cause may logically
and properly follow a pretrial conference when
the pretrial procedure has disclosed the lack of
4
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a disputed issue of material fact and the fact so
established indicate an unequivocal right to judgment favoring a party.
Also, in Silvera v. Broadway Dep't Store, Inc.,
J5 F. Supp. G25 ( S.D. Cal., 19410), the court stated,
35 F. Supp. at 627:
The court has power under pretrial rule No. 16
to dismiss ·when the facts submitted and proved
show no cause of action.
Therefore, as a general proposition, a pretrial court
may, when the record discloses an issue which presents
no real controversy, dismiss the cause of action based on
that issue.
However, the record in the instant case indicates
that the dismissal of appellant's first cause of action at
the pretrial hearing actually constituted a granting by
the pretrial court of respondent's motion for summary
judgment. The record discloses that the respondent filed
a motion for summary judgment (R. 48) with supporting affidavits (R. 49, 50, 50A and 50B). Appellant also
tiled a motion for summary judgment and a traverse
to defendant's motion for summary judgment (R. 51)
with supporting affid~n-its ( R. 53 and 54). Memoranda
iu support of the respective motions were submitted
(R. 60-64 and 65-69). The record further disclosed that
respondent served notice on the appellant that the
respondent's motion for summary judgment would be
ninde at the pretrial hearing (R. 47). Based on the
rceord, it is apparent that the dismissal of appellant's

5

first cause of action was tantamount, if not in fact ,
a granting by the pretrial court of the respondent's
motion for summary judgment.
The propriety of a pretrial court to grant a summary judgment was considered by the Supreme Court
of New Jersey in Sheild v. Welch, 4 N.J. 563, 73 A.2d
536 (19~0). The court stated, 4 N.J. at 566, 73 A.2dat
537:

It is further observed that at the pretrial conference memorandum of law were directed to be
submitted to the court; that such memoranda
in which the party stated their respective positions and their impressions of the applicable law
were accordingly filed; that the memorandum
filed by the defendant concluded with the follow·
ing statement: 'We retspectfully submit that
plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment, but that
her action should be dismissed and no cause
entered, and that thereafter the court entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
Thus it appears that the opportunity to fully
argue the substantive question was availed of by
the respective parties. The court concluded that
the case resolve itself into a question of law and
accordingly entered summary judgment for the
defendant. [Emphasis added.]

The court concluded, 4 N.J. at 567, 73 A.2d at 538:
We agree with the county court, for. reas~ns
hereinafter stated, that the only questions m·
volved in the pretrial conference was one of law.
Under such circumstances and in view of the fact
that the substantive question was fully presenter!
to the court by the respective parties we find no
6

procedural impropriety in the court's hearing of
a summary judgment.
It is respectfully submitted that the pretrial court's
dismissal of plaintiff's first cause of action was in fact
:, granting of respondent's motion for summary judgment. Therefore, as stated in 6 .Moore, Federal Practice
i;)U.27(1), at 2973 (2d ed. 1966):

YVhere a timely appeal is taken from an appealable order granting summary judgment, the
~Lppellate cour-C in reviewing must determine
whether there is any genuine issue of material
fact underlying the adjudication, and, if not,
whether the substant of law was correctly applied.
Based on the following arguments, respondent
respectfully submits that the dismissal of appellant's
'.irst cause of action by the pretrial court was proper
because of the failure of that issue to present a real
contro-;rersy aed also because of the failure of that issue
to present a disputed issue of material fact.

POINT II.
APPELLANT'S
ALLEGATIONS
SET
FORTII TO ESTABLISH A BREACII OF
CONTRACT ON TIIE PART OF TI-IE RE~~PONDENT DO NOT, AS A :MATTER OF
LA \V, CONSTITUTE A DISPUTED MATERL\_L ISSUE OF FACT.
Appellant has relied on several theories and allegatious to establish the existence of a disputed material

L
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issue of fact. Each allegation will be rebutted by the
respondent and the record.
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
Appellant alleges that the Del Mag D-12 combustion type hammer that appellant sought to use on the
subject project was used and accepted by the respondent on a prior project identified as the 21st South
project (R. 2, IO, 17, and 34). Because of this prior
use, appellant contends that the respondent is now
estopped from denying appellant the privilege of using
the same hammer on the present project. The general
rules governing the applications of the doctrines of
estoppel as applied to a state or state agency are set
forth in Annot. I A.L.R.2d 338, 360 ( 1948) :
Generally speaking, the doctrine of estoppel
will not be a pp lied against any governmental
agency such as a commission or a board acting
in its public capacity.
The rule is further stated in 28 Am. J ur. 2d, Estop·
pel and Waiver, § 123, at 784 ( 1966):
Thus, as a general rule, the doctrine of estoppel
will not be applied against the state in its gov·
ernmental, public, or sovereign capacity....

It is elementary that the construction, maintenance,
and repair of a highway system is a governmental func·
tion. Villages of Eden and Hazelton v. Idaho Bd. of
Highway Directors, 83 Idaho 554, 367 P .2d 294 ( 1961);
State v. State Comm'n of Revenue and Taxation, 163
8

Kan. 240, 181 P.2d 532 ( 1947) ; Almond v. Gilmer,
188 Va. 822, 51 S.E.2d 272 (1949); Yarrow v. State,
:HS P.2d 687 (Cal. 1960); 40 C.J.S., Highways, § 177
(1945).

Equally well established is the doctrine that the
state, when acting in its goYernmental capacity, cannot
be estopped notwithstanding the unauthorized acts of
its agent. State v. Jacobi, 73 Ariz. 193, 239 P.2d 1081
(1952); Wheeler v. Santa Ana, 181 P.2d 373 (Cal.
1947).

In Main v. Dep't of Highways, 206 Va. 143, 142
S.E.2d 524 ( 1965), plaintiffs contended that during the
preparation of their bid, representatives of the defendant
had assured them that a number of sources of select
material located within the roadway limits would be of
iufficient "CBR value" and of suitable quality to be
employed for the select material requirements of the
contract. Relying on the representations, the plaintiffs
submitted a bid totalling a certain amount. Subsequently, defendant notified plaintiffs that the material
11as unsuitable and that plaintiffs would be obligated
to secure select material outside the designated area. To
do this, the plaintiffs incurred additional costs not
ref-l.ected in the original bid submitted to the defendant.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had waived
and was estopped to invoke those certain contractual
provisions which authorized the defendant to direct the
pl:iintiffs to obtain a new source of select material.
The court held, 206 Va. at 150, 142 S.E.2d at 529:

9

But, aside from this, it is well settled that the
doctrine of estoppel does not apply to the rights
of a state when acting in its sovereign or govern.
mental capacity.

I
The plaintiffs' complaint was accordingly dismissed. I
In the instant case, appellant alleges that respondent is estopped because of appellant's use of the combustion type hammer on a prior project, to presently
insist on compliance with the contractual provision that
requires a mutual agreement between the contractor and
respondent's chief structural engineer for the use of a
combustion type hammer on a project prior to the actual
use of this type hammer. As supported by the authori·
ties, such an argument is untenable as a matter of law.
In addition to the general principles stated above,
it must be noted that, even assuming arguendo that
appellant's combustion type hammer was used on a prior
project, the record reveals that this prior use was not
accomplished or pursuant to the contractual provisions.
The State of Utah Standard Specifications for Road
and Bridge Construction, § 5-10.2, provide:
Combustion type pile hammers may be used
in lieu of air or steam hammers, provided a rating
(energy per blow) mu,tually agreed upon bJJ th.e
contractor and the chie.f structural engineer is
established prior to use. [Emphasis added.]
In response to respondent's interrogatories, appellant answered ( R. 34) :

10

The acceptance was oral and occurred by reason of the fact that the defendant was informed
of the use of the Del .Mag D-12 hammer . . . .
This answer conclusively establishes that a mutual
agreement was not effectuated between the contractor
and respondent's chief structural engineer prior to the
use of the Del Mag D-12 combustion type hammer on
the prior project. Rather, respondent was merely "informed of the use."
A further indication of the noncompliance with
the above-quoted section of the State of Utah Standard
Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction is
appellant's further answer to respondent's interrogatory
that, "Maurice Anderson and Ray Behling, employees
of the defendant, approved this use" (R. 34). The above_
quoted section specifically requires that the agreement
be between the contractor and the respondent's chief
strudural engineer. Now here is it alleged in the record
that the prior use of appellant's combustion type hammer was pursuant to a mutual agreement with respondent's chief structural engineer prior to the actual use
of the hammer. Neither of the two employees alleged
by appellant to have approved the use of appellant's
hammer on the prior project occupied the position of
chief structural engineer of respondent at the time the
alleged approval was given. This court may take judicial notice of the official records of the Utah State Road
Conunission and conclude neither employee, in fact.
occupied the position of respondent's chief structural
engineer. Borrson v. IJf issouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 172
11

S.,V.2d 835 (.Mo. 1943) ; State v. Fischer, 17 Wis.2<l
141, 115 N.,V. at 553 ( 1962) ; American Fork Irr. t'.
Linke, 121 Utah 90, 239 P.2d 188 ( 1951).
Therefore, the appellant may not rely on the alleged
prior approval of respondent as a basis for presently
estopping respondent from permitting appellant to use
the hammer on the present project because the contractual provisions in force at the time were not complied
with when the prior approval was allegedly given.
Appellant cites the dissent in State v. Northwest
1lfagnesite Co., 28 Wash.2d 1, 182 P.2d 643 (1947),
as establishing the general rule. However, respondent
submits the rule is more accurately stated by the major·
ity, 28 Wash.2d at 28, 182 P.2d at 657:
The doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked to
enforce the promise of an officer or agent against
a corporation or government, if such representa·
tive person had no legal capacity or power to
enter into such an obligation.
Appellant also fails to recognize that the legal
entity which was the recipient of the alleged prior ap·
proval is not the same legal entity that is presently
attempting to gain the benefits of the alleged prior
approval. A more flagrant shortcoming of appellant's
argument is that the argument fails to recognize the
obvious possibility, and in fact the probability, that the
actual construction sites and conditions, such as sub·
terranean conditions, would vary greatly between the
two projects. Therefore, appellant cannot claim a justi·
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ficd reliance on the alleged prior approval of the use
of the combustion type hammer as being tantamount to
and a basis for estopping the respondent from subsequently refusing to allow the use of the combustion
type hammer on the present project.
It must also be noted that the cases cited by appellant do not support his position. In Tanner v. Provo
Reservoir Co., 76 Utah 335, 289 Pac. 151 (1930);
I. X. L. Stores v. Success Mkt., 98 Utah 160, 97 P.2d
577 ( 1939) ; Kelly v. Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83 P.2d
731 ( 1938) and Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Bros.,
15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000 ( 1964), appellant must
concede that the issue of applying the doctrine of estoppel to governmental agencies is not discussed. The cases
are, therefore, immaterial as to the present consideration.

It is, therefore, respectfully submitted, that appellant's allegation of equitable estoppel must be denied
as a matter of law.

'¥AIVER
Respondent submits that the proposition that the
state may waive a contractual condition is not applicable
to the present factual situation. As stated in 28 Am.
Jur., Estoppel and TVaiver, § 157, at 840 (1966):
Voluntary choice is of the very essence of
waiver. It is a voluntary act which implies the
ehoice by the party to . . . forego some right or
advantage which he might at his option have
demanded and insisted on.

13
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It is further stated in 28 Am.J ur., Estoppcl and
Waiver, § 158, at 842 ( 1966) :

Indeed, the essence of a waiver, as indicated
by its definition, is the voluntary and intentional
relinquish1nent of a known right. lEmphasis
added.]
If appellant is attempting to apply the doctrine
of waiver to the alleged prior approved use of appel·
lant's combustion type hammer on the 21st South proj·
ect, it must be noted that the alleged waiver was not
executed by the only person authorized to waive the contractually established requirement. In any event, such
a prior waiver of the contractual condition would not
apply to the subsequent independent contract and project. A waiver does not relate forward to affect future
agreements, and a present waiver of a certain contractual condition does not operate as a prospective waiver
of all similar future conditions. 28 Am. J ur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver,§ 157 (1966).

To allege that the doctrine of waiver of the con·
tractual condition a pp lies to the present construction
contract and project is to ignore the fact that the basis
of the present controversy between appellant and respondent stems from the refusal of the respondent to
allow appellant the use of the combustion type hammer
on the present project.
Under all considerations, the doctrine of waiYer
must be denied as a matter of law.
14

PRIOR AGREE.MENT OF THE STATE
Respondent submits that appellant's allegations
concerning a prior agreement by respondent have been
sufficiently answered in the considerations of appellant's
contentions of equitable estoppel and waiver of conditions. However, it must be noted that nothing in the
record indicates a prior agreement between appellant
and respondent's chief structural engineer applicable
to the present construction contract and project. The
prior agreement alleged by appellant is obviously the
alleged prior agreement given at the 21st South project.
This contention, having previously been answered, must
also fail as a matter of law.

BREACH O:F CONTRACT
The State of Utah Standard Specifications for
Road and Bridge Construction, §5-10.2, require a mutual
agreement between the contractor and respondent's chief
structural engineer establishing the energy rating of a
eombustion type hammer before that type hammer may
be used on a project. In Murphy v. Salt Lake City,
65 Utah 295, 236 Pac. 680 ( 1925) , the contractor alleged
that the architect had arbitrarily and capriciously refused to inspect a certain type terra cotta proposed by
the contractor to be utilized in the construction of the
contract project. This court concluded that the facts
fell within the category whereby a contractor may furnish or be allowed to use a substitute article of a similar
nature to the particular articles specified in the contract,
15

provided that the substitution be approved by the owner
or another designated person. On this basis, the court
concluded, 65 Utah at 303, 236 Pac. at 683:
That under lthis situationJ the owner is entitled
to the article stipulated for unless he or the per·
so11 11amed approves a substitute, and in approv·
ing or in refusing to approve a substitute, the
judgrnent of the owner or person narned must
prevail unless he acts in bad faith. A mere error
of judgment in that regard is not sufficient to
entitle the contractor to relief at the hands of a
court of justice. lEmphasis added.]
In answer to respondent's interrogatory 1-C of
set II (Supp. R. 147), appellant conceded that there
was no '·bad faith" on the part of the respondent's chief
structural engineer in the rejection of appellant's com·
bus ti on type hammer ( R. 44) . Therefore, by appellant's
own admission that the respondent's chief structural
engineer acted without "bad faith," appellant's alleged
breach of contract must fail as a matter of law. This
doctrine, that a contracting party is entitled to that
which is contracted for, and that the refusal to allow
a substitute will not give rise to a cause of action unless
that refusal is grounded on bad faith, is well supported
by the authorities. McGrath v. Electrical Constr. Co.,
370 P.2d 231 (Ore. 1962); Benjamin Foster Co. v.
Commonwealth, 61 N.E.2d 147 (Mass. 1945).
This court, in Campbell Bld,q. Co. v. Slate Rd.
Comm'n, 92 Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857 (1937), state!!.
95 Utah at 266, 70 P.2d at 868:
16

'Vhen the parties to a contract agree that the
architect or engineer or other person shall exercise pmver of decision, the courts v;ill uphold such
as valid and the decision must stand unless shown
to have been made arbitrarily or in bad faith.
As stated above, appellant admitted that the respondent's chief structural engineer did not act in a
manner allowing a finding that the actions constituted
bad faith. Generally, to act arbitrarily, includes the
element of bad faith. As stated in Goodrum v. State,
158 S.,V.2d 81, 86 (Tex. 1942):
The word 'arbitrary' has been used on numerous occasions by our courts in defining the type
of conduct which would prevent the decision of
an architect or engineer from becoming final and
has been expressly held to contemplate 'bad faith.'
It is defined as failure to exercise an honest judgment. [Emphasis added.]
The court further stated, 158 S.W. 2d at 87:
[arbitrary is further defined as] fixed or done
capriciously or at pleasure; without adequate
determining principle ... nonrational; not done
or acting according to reason or judgment ...
tyrannical; despotic.
It may not be said that the respondent's chief
structural engineer acted in any manner that may be
considered arbitrary. For example, the record indicates
('!le reason why respondent's chief structural engineer
rtict not accept the manufacturer's energy rating of
appellant's combustion type hammer. This was because
tlw California Division of Highways had rated appel-
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lant's hammer at 16,500 foot pounds per blow or approximately '1'5 percent of the manufacturer's rating of
22,500 foot pounds (R. 50A). Appellant concedes that
the energy rating requirement on the subject construction project was 18,000 foot pounds per blow (R. IO).
To acknowledge respondent's chief structural engineer's
awareness of the California Division of Highways'
energy rating of plaintiff's combustion type hammer to
be 75 percent of the manufacturer's rating, but to insist
that respondent's chief structural engineer should have
nonetheless authorized the use of appellant's combustion
type hammer on the project, would be a prohibitiou
against respondent's chief structural engineer utilizing
his best judgment based on his experience, expertise and
other known facts. In light of the respondent's chief
structural engineer's knowledge, rejection of the appellant's combustion type hammer was not only an exercise
cf good judgment, but also mandatory by the terms of
i.:he contract which provided an energy rating of 18,000
foot pounds per blow. The statement found at page
eleven of appellant's brief that, "Furthermore, the State
admitted and recognized that the D-12 hammer ha<l a
proper rating," is completely erroneous. Respondent's
chief structural engineer agreed that the manufacturer's
rating was 22,500 foot pounds per blow, but disagreed
with the manufacturer's rating in light of the ratiug
given the combustion type hammer of appellant by tk
California Division of Highways (R. 50A).
The issues to whether respondent's chief structural
engineer acted arhi trarly must be examined not onl~- iu
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light of the chief structural engineer's knowledge and
expertise, but also in light of the total circumstance that
surrounded the rejection of appellant's combution type
hammer.
Appellant, in response to respondent's interrogatory l(A) (Supp. R. 146), answered:
The very facts surrounding the test indicated
that they were inaccurate, speculative and immaterial. All of those present could see or should
have realized that the tests were inaccurate,
speculative and immaterial. (R. 44.)
However, appellant also answered respondent's
interrogatory 3 (Supp. R. 147) :
Nothing was presented at that particular time,
other that the fact that the defendant had approved the use on another job and the fact that
the manufacturer had made this particular rating.
(R. 45.)
'Vhere the pretrial court concluded that, although
appellant alleged various inconsistencies in the conduct
of the test of appellant's combusion type hammer, the
admitted fact that nothing was done by appellant at that
time, either in the form of proffered facts, evidence,
suggestions, or proposed tests, appellant's allegation of
arbitrary action must fail as a matter of law, such conclusion is not only logically mandatory, but also legally
required. Although appellant now screams arbitrary unfairness, appellant took no such position at the vital time
of the consideration of the fitness of appellant's combustion type hammer. To presently allege arbitrary
19

action, but to admit that at the time the alleged arbitrar.1
action occurred, nothing was pursued by appellant to
illustrate the arbitrary nature of the action is entireh·
inconsistent. The failure of appellant to object to tl;l I
proposed test or in any manner present additional eri I
dence or proposals bars appellant from presently recovering on the basis of such a claim. 3 J\'.IcBride and
'Vachtel, Government Contract,§ 2IA0(12) (196ti).
Further recognition must be given to the fact that
before the energy rating of appellant's combustion type
hammer is to be consistent with that of other type of
hammers, the combustion type hammer must be aLle
to drive piling to an equivalent depth as an air or stcalll
hammer which has the same energy rating, i.e., the abilil)
of the diesel hammer to penetrate the ground at critical
depths of the construction site must be equivalent to that
of the other type of pile hammers. If the ability of the
combustion type hammer to penetrate the soil were lcso
the contract provision requiring a pile to be driven until
it offers a specified resistance to the blow of the pile
hammer would be complied with, but the pile would be
at a more shallow depth with resulting less bearing
capacity. As the record indicates (R. 50A):

1

The specifications for pile driving equipment
furnished on the west Salt Lake freeway projects
require a pile hammer capacity of not less ti.mu
18,000 foot pounds per blow. In addition, a mm1·
mum blow count is required which exceeds the
hlow eouut required by the standard pile driYing
formulas for a Q'iven capacity. The intent of tk·':
requirements is to insure pile penetration n! :
1
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dense but thin lenses of sand which are interspersed in soft material. These sand lenses might
support a pile driven with a pile hammer of lesser
capacity, or where lesser blow count is required,
but would not properly support a cluster of piles.

1

Appellant may contend that these statement by
the respondent's chief structural engineer may be rebutted at a trial of this issue on the merits. However,
such an argument totally fails to recognize that the
eritical determination to be made is whether respondent's
chief structural engineer acted in bad faith or arbitrarily.
Therefore, the knowledge and expertise of respondent's
chief structural engineer is precisely what that determination depends on. The record is clear that the actions
taken by respondent's chief structural engineer in refusing appellant the use of the combustion type hammer
on the subject project must be held to be as a matter
of law, reasonable and free from all allegations of arbitrariness.

Appellant submits that Midgley v. Campbell Bldg.
Co., 38 Utah 293, 112 Pac. 820 (1911), supports his
position. However, in that case, the articles furnished
, by a subcontractor and which were rejected by the superYising architects, 38 Utah at 299, 112 Pac. at 822:
... were in accordance with the plans, details,
and specifications prepared by the supervising
architect, and were in quality and character in
every way equal to the requirements of the plans,
details, and specifications, and that they fell short
in the circumstance only that they were supplied
by and purchased from Crane and Company
instead of Clowe & Sons ....
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The fact situation in Midgley v. Campbell Bldy.
Co., supra, is completely opposite to the fact situation
of the instant case. The instant case is not concerned with
the proposition that appellant's combustion type hammer admitte<lly complied in every manner with the spc·
cifications. Rather, the record is clear that the reasonable
concern of respondent's chief structural engineer was
that the combustion type hammer would not, in fact,
comply with the specifications of the contract. Therefore,
the cited case is not authority for appellant's position.
Appellant also cites Davies v. Kahn, 251 F.2d 324, 328
( 1958), for the proposition that "An architect has no
inherent power to insist on an article of particular manufacture, not specified in the contract over one that in all
respects responds to the contract." Again, this case does
not support appellant's position because of respondent's
chief structural engineer's conclusion that the appellant's
combustion type hammer did not respond to the contract
specifications.
The primary consideration in determining whether
respondent breached the subject contract by and through
the refusal of respondent's chief structural engineer tu
mutually agree to the use by appellant of the combustion
type hammer on the project is whether respondent's chief
structural engineer acted in bad faith or arbitrarily.
Recognition must be given to respondent's chief struc·
tural engineer's admitted knowledge and expertise. The
record is clear that respondent's chief structural engineer was aware of an official state energy rating that was
in fact 75 percent that of the manufacturer of appel·
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Jant's combustion type hammer energy rating. It may
uot be said that, in light of this knowledge and expertise,
respondent's chief structural engineer acted arbitrarily.
Appellant's contention must fail as a matter of law.

POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S l\J.:OTION POR RECONSIDERATION AND AMENDMENT OP THE
PRETRIAL ORDER.
Respondent agrees that in certain instances, modification of a pretrial order should be allowed to prevent
a manifest injustice. However, such was not the case
in the instant matter. Appellant fails to recognize that
no issue or contention in addition to the issues and contentions considered by the pretrial court were presented
to the court in motion for reconsideration. In other
words, the pretrial court was merely asked to reconsider
lhe issues and contentions that it had previously considered at the pretrial hearing and reverse its conclusion.
No authority is cited by appellant, and indeed no authority could be cited by appellant, sustaining the proposition that once a pretrial order has been entered, a motion
hr an allegedly aggrieved party to the pretrial court
merely asking the court to reconsider its conclusions,
automatically works as a basis on which the pretrial
rirdcr may be reversed. In light of the fact that no new
issue or contention was presented to the pretrial court
at the motion for reconsideration, the pretrial court
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merely adhered to the conclusions that had previous!)
been reached. This does not constitute error.

Appellant's brief, at page 27, states, "The pretrial
court and trial court lhave] thus effectively preventer!
any amendments to the pleadings, and turned the pretrial into a summary judgment proceeding without
proper notice, or legal factual basis." However, the record clearly establishes that respondent gave notice to
appellant that respondent's motion for summary judg·
ment would be made before the court at the time or
pretrial ( R. 47) .

POINT IV.

DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S FIRST
CAUSE OF ACTION AT THE PRETRIAL
STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS DID N01
CONSTITUTE A DENIAL OF APPEL
LANT'S RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY.

Appellant's argument totally disregards the nn
ture of a dismissal of a cause of action for the failur1
of the issues presented to present a real controversy 01
a disputed material issue of fact. As stated in 6 Moore
Federal Practice,§ 56.06(2), at 2080:

If the only question involved in the litigatior
is one of law and there is no dispute as to mate1:1:1
issues of fact, there is no room for a conte11t1m
by the losing party that the granting of t.h:
motion for summary judgment deprives it (If:
jury trial.
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The above-quoted proposition is supported by the
;reat weight of authority. To support appellant's contention \Vould be to completely hold void such rules of
rrocedure as Utah R. Civ. P. 12 (b), 12 ( c), and 56. The
dttire philosophy on which the Utah Rules of Civil Protedure is based is to allow, " ... the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Utah R. Civ.
P. I. 'Vhen the record discloses that the issues are not
meritoriously presented, i.e., the issues fail to raise a
1lisputed material issue of fact, it becomes the court's
obligation to dismiss the cause of action based on those
tssues.

It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the
rtismissal of appellant's first cause of action was proper
and in accord with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
, and appellant's arguments must be denied as a matter
' of law.

I
I
I

!
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CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that each allegation relied on
by appellant to justify a trial of appellant's first cause
of action on the merits has been rebutted. Each and
every allegation must be denied as a matter of law and
under no theory could appellant recover against the
respondent at a trial on the merits. It is, therefore,
respectfully submitted that the dismissal of appellant's
first cause of action should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
GARY A. FRANK
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent

26

